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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OVER ASSET
RESTRUCTURING
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachtert
In both the union and nonunion sectors, firms restructure their assets
and production, deciding continuously whether to make or buy an input
(the subcontracting decision), as well as whether to continue or to exit a
product line. The principal difference in the legal requirements applicable
to restructuring in the union sector lies in the National Labor Relations
Act's (NLRA) obligation to bargain over the "terms and conditions of
employment." This obligation raises the legal question of when, in an
asset restructuring, there is a duty to bargain with the union. The question
has significance for asset restructuring in both the union and nonunion
sectors because the regime of explicit contracting encouraged by the
NLRA provides our clearest window into the less easily identified patterns
of implicit contracting that prevail in the substantially larger nonunion
sector. In this Article, we use labor economics to elucidate the nature of
the question, the competing concerns, and, finally, to provide a positive
theory of the law.'
In Part I, we describe the problems raised by the restructuring of
production through subcontracting and asset sales, and describe, in highly
stylized form, the principal types of cases that arise. In Part II, we
summarize the current state of the law as it applies to these common types
of cases. Finally, in Part I, we analyze the economic logic of the legal

f Edward B. Rock is Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1977,
Yale University; B.A. 1980, University of Oxford; J.D. 1983, University of Pennsylvania.
Michael L. Wachter is the William B. Johnson Professor of Law and Economics at
the University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1964, Cornell University; M.A. 1967, Ph.D. 1970,
Harvard University.
An abbreviated version of this article was published in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (1987) under the title Asset Restructuring and Union
Bargaining.
1. The analysis in this work draws on Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor

Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. REv. 203 (1993) and
MICHAEL L. WACHTER, A BEACON IN THE FOG: A UNIFIED RULE FOR ALL ToPicS OF
BARGAINING (University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper,
1997).

202

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:1

doctrines by summarizing the relevant economic analyses and applying
them to the principal types of cases that arise.
I.

TWO TYPES OF ASSET RESTRUCTURING: SUBCONTRACTING AND

ASSET SALES
Firms restructure for a variety of reasons: declines in the product
markets; shortages in the labor markets; changes in input markets;
technological change rendering current production techniques obsolete;
and so forth. In restructuring, management faces a choice between
subcontracting production to a factor outside the firm (the "make versus
buy" decision), or exiting the product line and disposing of the assets. The
choice between subcontracting and exiting, and the choices posed within
each, form basic and repeating asset restructuring fact patterns that raise
characteristic issues under the NLRA's duty to bargain.
When a firm subcontracts, it moves operations (production or
services) which had been carried out within the firm to factors outside the
firm. In other words, the firm decides to stop making an input and to buy
it instead. A prominent feature of this decision is that the finn continues in
its product market, making adjustments in its input supply. Suppose that
Computer Manufacturer, Inc., which, until now, has produced its own
laptop cases, decides to "subcontract" laptop case production. There are
three principal types of cases that arise, with a variety of cases falling in
between these illustrative types:
SUBCONTRACTING A: Computer, without first bargaining to
impasse, replaces the employees handling case making with
lower-cost personnel supplied by an outside contractor.
Employees perform the same work in the same place, under the
same supervision, with no reduction in output or change in
technology.
SUBCONTRACTING B: Computer hires Plastiforms, a national
plastic fabricating company, which uses its own equipment and
employees to make Computer's laptop cases along with other
plastic products. The employees work under the tight control of
Plastiforms, which uses its own scheduling and work
requirements.
SUBCONTRACTING C: Computer offers its own employees the
opportunity to serve as independent contractors for the firm. The
case-making equipment is sold to those employees who accept
the proposition. Computer buys the cases for a fixed price.
However, it no longer supervises the case makers other than to
demand that the cases be up to a particular quality standard.
Sometimes the firm decides not to subcontract the production of an
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input to outsiders, but decides instead to exit the product line. Suppose,
for example, that Computer decides to exit the laptop business. Note here,
that in contrast to the subcontracting context, the firm no longer continues
in its product market. Again, there are three types of cases that arise upon
a decision to exit:
EXIT A: Computer sells the laptop division or subsidiary intact to
Newco, which continues operations unchanged.
EXIT B: Computer terminates its laptop employees and sells its
laptop-making equipment to a second-hand machinery dealer,
which sells the machinery piecemeal, or, if the assets are sold as
a package, to Newco, who uses the assets to make new products
(e.g., disk drives), using new employees.
EXIT C: Computer sells all its laptop assets to Newco, which
retains most of Computer's laptop employees and puts them to
work making laptops the same way.
Subcontracting A, B, and C all raise the question of what obligations
to bargain, if any, fall on an existing firm upon a decision to subcontract an
input. In contrast, Exit A, B, and C all raise the question of what
obligations to bargain, if any, fall on a firm which buys assets from a firm
exiting a product line. The duties of the asset acquirer are known as
"successorship liability" and arise under corporate law, labor law, and
products liability law. In this Article, we look only at one corner of the
question, namely, when an asset purchaser has a duty to bargain under the
NLRA.
These six fact patterns represent the major types of subcontracting
and successorship cases and raise all the fundamental issues that arise in
the multitude of cases that fall in between. The issues raised by these
cases are closely related to a variety of other changes of scope and
direction of the firm. In particular, the analysis that we use here can be
used to analyze the duty to bargain in other contexts in which it arises,
namely, work relocation and reassignment.
These cases raise several concerns. In any asset restructuring, the
employer can be assumed to be trying to increase profits while retaining
managerial flexibility. This goal can be accomplished in a variety of ways,
including buying inputs from an outside supplier who can produce them
more cheaply; replacing expensive unionized employees with inexpensive
nonunionized employees supplied by an outside subcontractor; selling the
assets to a firm that can operate them more efficiently because of new
technology or technique; or selling the assets to a firm that will maintain
operations but pay employees less. For their part, the employees worry
about maintaining their jobs, as well as about subcontracting or asset sales
being used as a mechanism to reduce wage rates, either by replacing
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employees or by paying existing employees less.
As we will show below, the current legal regulation can be
understood as a reasonably successful attempt to facilitate the efficient
restructuring of enterprises while protecting each side against ex post
attempts to grab a greater share of the joint surplus from the relationship.
By protecting the parties against ex post opportunism, the law encourages
the parties to invest optimally, ex ante, in match specific assets.
II.

THE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SUBCONTRACTING AND SUCCESSORSHIP:
THE DUTY TO BARGAIN

A.

The Duty to Bargain

The duty to bargain plays a central role in the NLRA system. Under
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer or a union "to refuse to bargain collectively." 2 Section 8(d)
defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. ' '3 While the parties have an
obligation to meet and confer in good faith, that obligation "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. 4
These vague but critical mandates have given rise to an extensive and
complex jurisprudence. 5 On the one hand, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and the courts have elaborated on the duty to meet, confer,
and negotiate, as well as on the obligation to deal in good faith. On the
other hand, they have limited the applicability of the duty to bargain to socalled "mandatory topics," specifically-drawing on the language of
section 8(d)---"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." For most other topics, bargaining is permissive, not
mandatory.6
The duty to bargain is critical for three reasons in the restructuring
context. First, when the duty to bargain applies, the employer must
2. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1996).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
4. Id.
5. See generally 1 THE DEVELOPiNG LABOR LAW ch. 13 (Patrick Hardin ed., 1992).
6. On the distinction between mandatory and permissive topics, see id. ch. 16; see
also First Nat'l. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958).
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bargain with the union over mandatory topics, risking an economic strike
if an agreement cannot be reached. Moreover, the employer will be unable
to institute changes in mandatory topics unilaterally without first
bargaining to impasse. Second, the duty to bargain maintains, establishes,
or reestablishes a bargaining relationship between the employer and the
union. Without it, the union must engage in an organizing drive, which is
typically very costly and has an uncertain outcome. Third, the duty to
bargain forces the parties to disclose information in certain defined
contexts
The duty to bargain thus provides the union with a low
transaction cost mechanism for reestablishing with the new employer the
employee protections that it had achieved with the old employer.
While serving these goals, however, the duty to bargain creates its
own opportunities for strategic behavior. Because the employer may not
make unilateral changes, even during a strike, before negotiations reach an
impasse, the duty to bargain provides a mechanism that skillful negotiators
may use for delay. By stringing out negotiations with sequential minor
concessions, anecdotal evidence suggests that a party may delay impasse,
and thereby preserve the status quo, for as long as two years.
The issues relating to the duty to bargain that are central to this
Article are the identification of circumstances in which the existing
employer must bargain with the union before subcontracting the supply of
an input (the subcontracting cases) and circumstances in which an asset
purchaser takes on a duty to bargain with the union which previously
represented the workers (the successorship cases).
B.

Subcontractingin Labor Law

Two principal Supreme Court decisions frame the legal analysis of
topics of bargaining: FibreboardPaperProducts Corp. v. NLRB8 and First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 9 According to Justice Stewart's
important concurring opinion in Fibreboard, the core conceptual
distinction between mandatory and permissive topics of bargaining is
whether the issue impacts "conditions of employment." Classic examples
of non-mandatory issues include decisions such as investing in laborsaving machinery, liquidating assets, or deciding to go out of business.'
7. When, for example, an employer claims that it is financially unable to meet the
union's demands, it must corroborate such claims on request. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Sioux City Stockyards, 293 N.L.R.B. 1 (1989); Accurate Die
Casting Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 284 (1989). Indeed, an employer's refusal to supply such
information may convert an economic strike into an unfair labor practice strike. See NLRB
v. Jarm Enters, Inc., 785 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1986).
8. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
9. 452U.S. 666 (1981).
10. See Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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More generally, issues that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control,"
those that involve the "commitment of investment capital and the basic
scope of the enterprise," are not mandatory because they are "not in
themselves primarily about conditions of employment."'" Similarly, topics
such as the choice of "advertising and promotion, product type and design,
and financing arrangements," are not mandatory because they have only an
"attenuated impact on the employment relationship."' 2 We call these
topics "category-l" decisions.
In contrast, mandatory topics are those decisions affecting wages,
benefits, and "the various physical dimensions of [the] working
environment.' 3 This includes factors such as hours, work performance,
seniority, and retirement rights. 14 In First National Maintenance, the
explicit list of mandatory topics was expanded to include the order of
succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules, topics
"almost exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and
employee."' 5 We call these topics "category-2" decisions.
Finally, there is a third category ("category-3") of management
decisions that are not clearly category-1 or category-2 decisions. These
decisions, although perhaps involving the total employment level of the
firm, are driven by other concerns:
[Decisions] that [have] a direct impact on employment, since
jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but had as
its focus.., a concern... wholly apart from the employment
relationship. This decision, involving a change in the scope and
direction of the enterprise,
is akin to the decision whether to be
16
in business at all.
Distinguishing between mandatory and permissive topics of
bargaining within category-3 has proven difficult, controversial, and the
subject of conflicting NLRB decisions. In FirstNationalMaintenance, the
Supreme Court proposed a test in which it attempted to distinguish
between topics that are primarily about labor cost issues, and are thus
amenable to resolution through bargaining, and topics that are primarily
about issues at the core of entrepreneurial control, as to which bargaining
is likely to be futile and a burden to the employer due to the costs of delay.
In Otis Elevator, a plurality of the Board, in an attempt to apply the

11. Id.
12. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676-77 (expanding on Justice Stewart's
opinion in Fibreboard).
13. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 222.
14. See id.
15. FirstNat'l Maintenance,452 U.S. at 677 (quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers
of Am., Local Union No. 1. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)).
16. Id.
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Supreme Court's First National Maintenance analysis, proposed a test
which, for a period of time, became the de facto standard. 7 The plurality's
test in Otis H proposed a "turns upon" standard that would mandate
bargaining if the decision turned upon labor costs, but not when it turned
upon the nature or direction of the business.'
The various tests of Otis II were eventually rejected by the D.C.
Circuit on several grounds, including inconsistency, vagueness and
incompleteness.' 9 In response, the NLRB, rather than delineating the
factors needed to implement the plurality test, offered yet another test."
Although the new test contained important components of the plurality's
test in Otis II, it was a distinct test. Moreover, the new test was to be
applied only to decisions involving work relocation. The upshot is that the
plurality's test, although applied unevenly, often with different
terminology, and generally without reference, remains the prevailing
standard used in implementing the Supreme Court's balancing test;
however, its legal vitality remains open to question. In addition, several
other tests have been developed to be applied to specific types of
subcontracting.
These principles allow us to turn to the three illustrative types of
subcontracting outlined above, and discuss their legal treatment.
In Subcontracting A, in which Computer replaces the employees
making laptop cases with lower-cost personnel supplied by an outside
contractor, employees perform the same work in the same place, doing the
same jobs, under more or less the same supervision with no reduction in
output or change in technology. This is the Fibreboardcase itself. Here,
as in Fibreboard,everything stays the same except that an outside firm
provides lower-cost employees who perform the same work in the same
place in the same way. Note that control of the production of the input

17. Otis Elevator is a trilogy: Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) [hereinafter
Otis Il] (establishing test for category-3 topics of bargaining), reversing 255 N.L.R.B. 235
(1981) [hereinafter Otis 1], 283 N.L.R.B. 223 (1987) (reviewing effects bargaining) [Otis

Il.
18. See 269 N.L.R.B. at 892.
[T]he critical factor to a determination whether the decision is subject to
mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision itself, i.e., whether it turns
upon a change in the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon labor
costs; not its effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer alternatives.
Id.
19. See United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880
F.2d 1422, 1435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
20. See Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 390 (1991), rev'g 287 N.L.R.B. 499
(1987). "The standard we announce today addresses only decisions to relocate unit work.
We express no view as to what standard will be used in analyzing the other management
decisions ... ." Id. at 390 n.8.
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remains with the employer. Because the only effect of the subcontracting
is to lower labor costs unilaterally, the subcontracting is a mandatory topic
of bargaining.
In Subcontracting B, Computer hires a national plastic fabricating
company which uses its own equipment and employees to produce laptop
cases along with other plastic products. The employees work under the
control of the plastic company using its own organization and work
requirements. Here, the national plastic fabricating company can provide
the laptop cases either at lower cost or higher quality. Control over
production passes fully to the subcontractor.
If we assume further that the plastic fabricating company in fact pays
higher wage rates than Computer, the law is reasonably well settled:
Computer would not have a mandatory obligation to bargain over the
decision.2' In terms of First National Maintenance's balancing test, the
decision would not be amenable to resolution through collective
bargaining because the decision was made for reasons that were not under
the control of the employees or the union.
If, however, the plastic firm's wage rates are lower than Computer's,
we reach the variety of cases in which the employer subcontracts work
previously done by unit employees to a third-party where labor costs may
be one of the factors in the decision, or at least one of the sources of
savings. This type of subcontracting arises frequently, and the legal
treatment is unclear. The cases can be differentiated according to the
importance of labor costs to the decision.
At one extreme is
subcontracting case A, Fibreboarditself, discussed above, in which labor
costs are the sole justification for subcontracting the work.
As more and more assets and control move to the subcontractor,
however, subcontracting ceases to be a mandatory topic. One step away
from Fibreboardwould be a case in which Computer subcontracts the
work to an independent plastics firm. The plastics company buys the
fabricating equipment from Computer and performs the work based on
specifications established by Computer on everything from size to method
of production. The contract allows Computer to reduce its manufacturing
costs materially. Here, again, because control remained in the hands of
Computer, it is clear that subcontracting would not have been profitable
but for the lower labor costs of the subcontractor. Accordingly, bargaining

21. See Furniture Rentors of Am., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 602 (1995), rev'g 311 N.L.R.B.
749, 756 (1993); Furniture Rentors of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir.
1994) (noting that the subcontractor's labor costs were higher than the company's labor
costs); cf Oklahoma Fixture Co. 314 N.L.R.B. 958, 966 (1994), affd, NLRB v. Oklahoma
Fixture Co., 79 F.3d 1030, 1033 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that the employer's
subcontracting was non-mandatory because it was related to the ability of the company to
manage the work and concerns over liability if the work was performed inadequately).
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would again be mandatory.22 The only difference between this case and
Fibreboarditself is that the subcontractor supervised its own employees in
implementing Computer's detailed instructions and used its own capital.
These, however, are unimportant differences. Although the supervisor
brought its own capital, different employees were still working with the
same capital, which was the case in Fibreboard.
But now consider Subcontracting C: Suppose that Computer decides
to end its laptop case fabrication operations, and, without first bargaining
to impasse, offers its own employees the opportunity to serve as
independent contractors for the firm. The fabricating machines are sold to
those employees who accept the offer. Computer buys the laptop cases
from the subcontractor, but no longer supervises the fabricating operations,
other than demanding that the products satisfy Computer's customers and

manufacturing needs.
Although such cases are somewhat unusual, they are important to
understanding the legal standard and, as discussed below, the economic
logic. In two cases decided shortly after Fibreboard,the courts held that
bargaining in such circumstances was not mandatory. 2 Although, as in
Fibreboard,the same employees perform the tasks in the same location,
control had passed from Computer to the now independent contractors. In
both NLRB v. Adams Dairy and Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm.
v. NLRB [hereinafter Yellow Cab], the courts of appeal held that this was a
critical difference because the now independent owner-distributors
determined the exact tasks to be performed.24 Because control had passed,
22. See Mid-State Ready Mix, 307 N.L.R.B. 809 (1992). This case establishes that the
Board will find a case mandatory where the facts are similar to those of Fibreboard. The
employer, Torrington, "simply replaced the two employees hauling sand and stone with a
nonunit employee and independent contractors, also hauling sand and stone." Id. at 810.
Although Torrington no longer transported cement powder in its own trucks, it continued to
use the same products and the same technology. In addition, the subcontractors delivered
materials to it under arrangements and schedules set by Torrington. See id. at 819.
23. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965). In outsourcing the
work, Adams Dairy sold its trucks to the new distributors, but did not finance the sale or in
any way facilitate the financing. It also sold the goods to the contractors, who, thereafter,
had complete freedom to conduct the business operation subject only to certain quality
conditions that needed to be met. The routes of the independent contractors did not
correspond to the previous routes of the driver-salesmen. The independent contractors took
title to the products at the dockside, and Adams, thereafter, legally had no concern with
what was done with the products. Adams was not directly concerned with any given
distributor's profits or losses, and the distributors had complete latitude in such critical
matters as the price they charged their customers, the drivers they employed, and the use of
helpers. See id. at 111; see also Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1979) [hereinafter Yellow Cab], rev'g Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B.
1329 (1977).
24. See Yellow Cab, 603 F.2d at 874 ("[The fundamental question is whether the
employer] has the right to control the driver during the course of his operation of the cab in
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the savings, as in case B above, were likely to come from a more efficient
operation and not simply from lower wage rates.
C.

Successorship Obligationsof a Purchaser

From a corporate law perspective, there are two ways to transfer
assets that, leaving aside tax considerations and opportunistic behavior,
serve two very different purposes. When the predecessor wishes to
transfer the operations as a going concern, the transaction is typically
structured as a merger or a stock sale. In such cases, from both the
corporate law and labor law perspectives, the transfer is essentially a nonevent. All contracts, leases and licenses remain in effect, and the firm,
under its new ownership, bears all obligations that the firm under its old
ownership had, including the duty to bargain.
By contrast, when a firm does not wish to transfer operations as a
going concern, but, rather, wishes to liquidate, it will typically dispose of
the assets piecemeal. Under corporate law, an asset purchaser generally
takes on only those obligations of the asset seller that it explicitly or
implicitly assumes.2' Because this general rule can, in certain cases, lead
to manipulation of the transactional forms in order to impose costs on third
parties, the rule is subject to several exceptions. For example, the general
rule, when combined with the corporate law rule that permits corporations
to dissolve and cut-off future claimants, creates an opportunity for firms to
avoid liability to long-tail tort claimants, which in turn creates a possibility
for the externalization of risk.26 To avoid this problem, the law seeks to
impose liability on the asset purchaser as a way of forcing the asset seller
to internalize the cost of future accidents. 27

the manner and means in which he earns his income and whether the drivers can be most
aptly described as working for themselves or for a wage they receive from companies.").
25. See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLErcHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF

PRIVATE CORPORAnONS § 7122 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
26. Specifically, suppose that Firm X makes widgets that tend to explode after twenty
years. If Firm X continues, it will be liable for the damages caused by the exploding
widgets. Suppose, however, that Finn Y buys only the assets of Firm X, and then Firm X
dissolves after paying off all current and contingent creditors. Under the traditional
corporate law framework, when the widgets began to explode twenty years later, the victims
would be without recourse. If the victims were to sue Firm Y, they would be met with the
argument that Firm Y acquired only the assets of Firm X, not the liabilities, and is therefore
not liable. If they were to sue Firm X, they would be met with the argument that Firm X no
longer exists and, even if victims could trace the former shareholders of X, that their claims
are barred as a matter of the law governing the dissolution of corporations. Such
externalization is inefficient in the obvious way: because the future victims cannot negotiate
an appropriate price to bear the risk of explosion, widget manufacturers will fail to
internalize the full costs of widgets.
27. For a summary, see Rock & Wachter, supra note 1, at 203.
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A similar legal structure has evolved under the National Labor
Relations Act. In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,2 the
Supreme Court held that, when substantial continuity exists between the
business of the asset seller and purchaser, the assetpurchaserhas a duty to
bargain with the seller's union if "the majority of its employees were
employed by its predecessor." 29 Note, however, that the seller's decision
to go out of business (either by selling stock or by selling assets) is not a
mandatory topic of bargaining, although the seller does have a duty to
bargain over the "effects" of the decision to exit.30
Substantial continuity has two elements: continuity of operations and
continuity of work force. The courts and the Board measure substantial
continuity of operations by whether the purchaser has "acquired substantial
assets of its predecessor and continued, without interruption or substantial
change, the predecessor's business operations."3' In measuring substantial
continuity of operations, the NLRB examines a number of factors,
including whether the business of both employers is essentially the same;
whether the employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the
same working conditions under the same supervisors; and whether the new
entity has the same production process, produces the same products, and
has the same body of customers.32 Substantial continuity of the work force
depends on what proportion of the new employer's work force was
employed by the old employer.33
Because the successor has no duty to hire the predecessor's
employees, however, the Court concluded that triggering the duty to

28. 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
29. Id. at 41.
30. See FirstNat'l Maintenance,452 U.S. at 681.
31. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973).
32. See FallRiver, 482 U.S. at 43.
33. A threshold question is whether the changes resulting from the capital market
transaction have affected the "appropriateness" of the bargaining unit. In making its
bargaining unit determination, the NLRB looks to a "community of interest" among the
workers. The factors in defining a community of interest include, for example, the
similarity in the method of determining compensation; the similarity in benefits, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment; and common supervision and determination of
labor relations policy. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS
283 (10th ed. 1986). FallRiver did not resolve the ambiguity in prior cases with respect to
whether the duty to bargain attaches if the asset purchaser hires a majority of the seller's
represented employees but those employees do not constitute a majority of the employees
of the purchaser. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 46 n.12. The Board, supported by the courts
of appeal, has held that work force continuity only exists if a majority of the asset
purchaser's employees were employed by the seller. See Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d
681, 684-86 & nn.2-3 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing relevant cases); Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B.
194, 196 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975); United Maintenance & Mfg. Co.,
214 N.L.R.B. 529, 532-34 (1974).
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bargain "rests in the hands of the successor. 4 The courts have made it
clear, though, that an asset purchaser cannot avoid a duty to bargain by
discriminating against employees of the seller because of their union
status."5 What counts as antiunion animus in the failure to hire employees
of the asset seller has been litigated extensively. 6 Critical factors that
suggest antiunion animus include: efforts by the new employer to discover
from the old employer the union sympathies of its employees, followed by
a refusal to hire those identified as sympathetic; hiring criteria with a
disparate impact; and an overall scheme designed to ensure that fewer than
a majority of the employees are union members. Factors inconsistent with
animus include unsuitability for new employer's operations, and uniformly
applied, valid business reasons for hiring a totally inexperienced work
force. In the aggregate, these factors suggest that, if a new employer
maintains the old operations intact, the hiring of new, inexperienced,
nonunion employees in preference to experienced, union employees
indicates antiunion animus." By contrast, if operations are changed so
substantially that experience in the old operation would be of little value in
the new operation, no such inference is warranted.
How, then, are our three successorship cases described above to be
analyzed? In Exit A, Computer exits the laptop business by disposing of
the business intact, as a going concern, by selling the stock of the laptop
subsidiary to Newco, who continues to make laptops the same way. In this
case, the duty to bargain carries forward.
In Exit B, Computer exits the laptop business, and disposes of its
assets either piecemeal or wholesale to a buyer who redeploys the assets to
make different products differently, and who does not retain the
34. FallRiver, 482 U.S. at 41.
35. See id. at 39-40; Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S.
249, 262 n.8 (1974); Elastic Stop Nut Div. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
36. For a general discussion, see the cases cited in 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 5, at 797 nn.168 & 170. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'g in part and aff'g in part, 268
N.L.R.B. 1483 (1984) [hereinafter Spencer Foods], provides one case in point. In Spencer
Foods, the court found that an asset purchaser discriminated against the union when it
adopted a hiring standard which disqualified many former union members from
consideration for reemployment but did not apply the standard uniformly in comparable
situations. Id. at 1474-76. By way of contrast, in Inland ContainerCorp., 267 N.L.R.B.
1187 (1983), modified by 273 N.L.R.B. 1856 (1985); 274 N.L.R.B. 887 (1985); 275
N.L.R.B. 378 (1985), Inland claimed that it refused to hire the predecessor's workers
because, having not been trained in the "Inland Way," they had formed "bad habits." When
the record showed that Inland applied this rule in comparable situations, the Board found no
antiunion animus. See Inland, 267 N.L.R.B. at 1190. Subsequent evidence that Inland only
hired applicants willing to work in a nonunion environment, however, led the Board to
reverse this finding. See 275 N.L.R.B. at 382-88.
37. See, e.g., United States Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1315-17 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992); Spencer Foods, 768 F.2d at 1474-76.
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employees. As a result, while there may or may not be substantial
continuity of operations, there is no substantial continuity of workforce
and, thus, no duty to bargain, absent a finding of antiunion animus.
By contrast, in Exit C, Computer sells its assets, its laptop machines,
to a new operator who continues to produce laptops the same way using
most of the same employees. In such cases, the duty to bargain carries
forward.
III. THE ECONoMIc LOGiC OF THE LEGAL STRUCTURES

A.

The Economic Model of the Employment Relationship: Contracting
Over Investments in Match

Our analysis draws on the "Internal Labor Market" 0(LM) literature in
labor economics." In this model, the relationships between a firm and its
ongoing employees can best be understood as a structured market, with its
own governance procedures that set, for example, wages, hours, conditions
of employment, promotion opportunities, and the grievance process. The
interactions between the firm and its employees are frequent, iterative and
complex, with the job and relationship evolving over time. The goal of the
firm and its employees is taken to be the maximization of joint profits.
Like any other relationship, the employment relationship is assumed to be
based on the potential for mutually advantageous exchange.
There are two central features of the typical employment relationship
that shape the nature of the interaction and the solutions that emerge.
First, the relationship is characterized by investments in the firm-employee
match that are lost if that match terminates. That is, the match investments
are sunk. Investments in match are defined as investments that are more
valuable to the contracting parties than to a third party. We use the term
"match-specific" investments in place of the perhaps more common "firmspecific" or "transaction-specific" investments or "investments in human
capital" because of its greater precision. Some but not all investments in
human capital will be investments in match. The term is more accurate
than "firm-specific" investments because it focuses better on the
contracting problem: some investments in match may, indeed, be more
specific than the firm level.
Second, the relationship is characterized by bilaterally asymmetrical
information. While the employees have superior information with respect
38. For an overview, see Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of
Internal LaborMarkets, 29 INDus. REL. 240 (1990); Michael L. Wachter, Human Capital
Investments and the Employment Relationship: Microeconomic Foundations, in HUMAN
CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1995).
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to their work effort and opportunities for employment outside the firm, the
employer has the information advantage with respect to the technology and
the market demand for the output produced by the employees.
The sunk investments in match create the potential for opportunistic
behavior." The potential is aggravated by the asymmetry of information
which sometimes enables the opportunistic party to disguise its actions. In
addition, the asymmetry of information acts as a side constraint on any
solutions to minimize opportunistic behavior.
For the employment relationship to induce the parties to invest
optimally in their match, solutions must be found to constrain such
behavior. Consider the standard problem posed by investments in matchspecific training. If a trained employee can produce more than an
employee hired from the outside, and if the employer bears the cost of
training, the employee, after being trained, can "hold up" the employer by
threatening to leave to work elsewhere unless the employer increases
wages. Similarly, if the employee bears the cost of training, the employer,
ex post, can hold up the employee by threatening to fire the employee
unless the employee accepts lower wages. Such threats are credible
because the investing party, but not the non-investing party, stands to lose
the return on its match-specific investments. The standard solution to this
problem is joint investment in the training: because both parties will bear a
loss if the relationship is terminated, the ability of either party to use the
threat of terminating the relationship to gain a greater share of the joint
surplus is reduced.
The ILM literature shows that many standard features of the
employment relationship can be best understood as incentive compatible
solutions to similar problems of opportunistic behavior. 0 One example is
the common practice of laying off employees during times of product
market downturn (and running the risk of losing an employee in whom the
employer has invested resources in training), rather than reducing wages
(and keeping the trained employee on the payroll). Despite the bilateral
investments in the match, a reduction in wages is not incentive compatible,
given the asymmetry of information: the employer has an incentive to
misrepresent product market conditions, to reduce wages, and gain a larger
39. We define opportunistic behavior as behavior whose purpose is to capture ex post a
larger share of the parties' joint surplus from the sunk investments in match.
40. A rule is incentive-compatible when it reduces the potential for gain while
increasing the potential for loss when a party acts opportunistically. See generallyWachter
& Wright, supra note 38, at 244-52; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996)
(discussing employment at will in the ILM context); Michael L. Wachter & George M.
Cohen, The Law andEconomics of Collective Bargaining:An Introductionand Application
to the Problems of Subcontracting, PartialClosure, and Relocation, 36 U. PA. L. REV.
1349 (1988).
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share of the joint surplus. By contrast, layoffs are incentive compatible
because the employer will bear a loss of output which it will be willing to
do only if product market demand has in fact declined.
The rules governing firms' exit from an industry parallel those
governing temporary layoffs.
The rule that firms can unilaterally
implement a decision to go out of business has strong incentive compatible
properties. Once out of business, the firm has lost whatever value is in the
ILM. Hence, the firm will only close when the ILM is indeed
unprofitable. The rules governing the process control the firm's incentives
to profit from the process or to pretend to be going out of business, by
imposing direct costs (severance pay) and indirect costs (laying off less
expensive junior workers before more expensive senior workers) on such a
firm.
The above analysis extends to subcontracting and successorship,
which generate different avenues for opportunism on the part of the
employer. In the prototypical subcontracting arrangement, the employer
hires a subcontractor who provides a labor input and terminates the match
with its own employees who had provided the service. The employer,
however, typically continues to operate unchanged in the principal product
market. Although such actions may be justifiable because the existing
match-investments have proven unprofitable, they create a possibility of
opportunistic threats or actions that merely redistribute the surplus from
existing employees. By contrast, in successorship, the employer typically
sells the assets that generate the product. In this case, the predecessor
employer can only be acting opportunistically if it can sell the assets at a
higher price to the successor, by putting the successor in an improved
position to act opportunistically.
B.

The ILM Analysis of SubcontractingDoctrine

Asset restructuring involving the subcontracting of work raises
specific difficulties not found in other types of restructuring. In particular,
because the firm continues in its product market after the prototypical
subcontracting, the firm's major sources of revenue are left unchanged and
the firm retains the control over product market based assets.
Restructuring that primarily involves labor cost changes is sensitive to

41. The ILM relationship between the parties is protected by either of two mechanisms.
In the union sector, the parties write explicit contract terms, enforceable by third parties, to
protect their investments. In the nonunion sector, the parties typically use norms that are
intended to be self-enforcing and are thus not enforced by third parties. Even in the union
sector, however, the written contract terms have central self-enforcing features. Since thirdparty enforcement is always costly, the ability to rely on the other contract terms is
important.
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opportunistic behavior, as the firm can redirect payments from its
employees to its own profits without directly impacting revenue.
However, not all subcontracting is open to opportunism on the part of the
employer. Some types, although affecting labor costs, are implemented
because of changes in the external environment which have made the
parties' match-assets no longer profitable to the employer under the
current terms. For example, some types of subcontracting are motivated
by the need to adjust to technological or regulatory changes, in which labor
costs are only peripherally involved. The three fact patterns developed
above are useful in showing how the law differentiates between these
cases.
SUBCONTRACTING A: Potential Opportunism. The ELM is
efficient, but Computer denies that any surplus exists and
subcontracts the work. The subcontractor's only function,
however, is to supply lower cost labor to Computer. Since the
same work is performed in the same place using the same
equipment, the ILM is clearly still profitable and is retained
unchanged. From Computer's perspective, only the wage rate
was too high. By outsourcing the work, Computer increases its
own profits by inserting new employees into the match-assets
created with its former employees. The employer's actions are
not self-enforcing since its actions allow it to capture the entire
surplus created by the match-assets.
SUBCONTRACTING B: Efficient Liquidation. Here, the ILM is
defective, either creating no surplus or incurring losses. By
subcontracting the work and allowing the subcontractor to
exercise full control of the manner in which the work is
performed, Computer exits this part of the supply chain and
abandons the match-assets. The subcontractor employs its own
match-assets using its own employees and capital. Because the
old match-assets are abandoned, there is no potential for
opportunism by Computer.
SUBCONTRACTING C: Efficient Transfer. The ILM is efficient,
but Computer does not realize sufficient profits to retain this part
of the supply chain. Alternatively, Computer believes that the
match-assets are more profitable if controlled by its employees.
By selling the physical assets of the match to the employees,
Computer exits the supply chain. The match-assets, however,
remain in place, but with the right to control passed to the
employees who now become independent contractors. The
potential for opportunism is low since Computer no longer
retains control over the match-assets and the profits generated by
the assets. Because the employees can decline the option of
becoming independent contractors, which would force Computer
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to hire independent contractors at market rates, Computer cannot
capture the match surplus by setting a supercompetitive price for
the match-assets that it sells to its own employees.
The task of labor law subcontracting doctrine can be best understood
as facilitating subcontracting case B and C transitions, while preventing
case A transitions. The goal is to create incentives for the optimal levels
of investment in match-assets. This is accomplished by allowing firms to
exit unprofitable matches while preventing them from capturing the
employees' share of the surplus in profitable matches.
The legal rule accomplishes this task by focusing on the right to
control the surplus to be realized from the use of the match-assets and not
on labor costs alone. Contrast Fibreboard and Adams Dairy. In
Fibreboard,the employer merely replaced its employees with those of the
subcontractor. Nothing else had changed, and the match-assets, minus the
employees, remained in use. The new subcontractor, presumably, paid
market wages to hire its employees. Hence, the match-assets, in prevailing
wages terms, were not unprofitable in themselves. By subcontracting,
Fibreboard's managers, a joint creator of the match-assets, retained the
profitable ILM structure, but used lower-wage subcontracted workers to
perform the same work. 42 Since there were no changes in operations, the
result was a pure shift in the surplus from the match from workers to the
firm.
The rule in Fibreboard deters such opportunistic behavior.
Fibreboard was not permitted simply to implement the change. Instead,
prior to implementation, it would need to bargain to impasse and to accept
the risk of a strike. Fibreboardis thus the classic example of case A
subcontracting.
In Adams Dairy, on the other hand, the Dairy itself exited the ILM,
leaving the employees who were willing to remain in place in charge of the
match-assets. The right to control the method in which the match-assets
were used was transferred to the employees. The employees, and not
Adams Dairy, were now the residual claimant on the returns generated by
the match-assets. Although Adams Dairy would hope to have lower
distribution costs than before, the ability to sell the assets at a supercompetitive rate was limited by the ability of the employees to refuse the
offer, at which point the assets would have to be sold to a third party. By
"cashing out" of their investment, the decision by Adams Dairy was not
prone to opportunism. By accepting the offer, the employees could change
the method in which the match-assets were used in any fashion that would
increase their return. The decision would be most profitable to the firm if,

42. In Fibreboard,the subcontractor provided workers to do "the same task in the same
plant under the ultimate control of the same employer." Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 224
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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in fact, the assets were more profitable if left to the employees' control. In
such a case, the firm would be able to cash out with lower distribution
costs and the former employees, now independent distributors, would have
higher income.
The legal rule, used in Adams Dairy and then formalized in Yellow
Cab, creates appropriate incentives for the efficient transfer of assets.
When the employer believes that the parties' surplus is maximized by
making employees the owners of the match-assets, it is free to exit the
match unilaterally and to sell the match-assets to the employees who wish
to purchase them. To protect against opportunistic transfer, however, the
employees must be given the right to control the variables at the core of
entrepreneurial control. That is, the employees must be truly independent
owner/operators and the employer must have truly cashed out of both the
supervisory and the residual claimant roles. With the employer unable to
exercise any supervision, it cannot take steps to redistribute the surplus
realized by the employees indirectly. Adams Dairy and Yellow Cab are
thus classic examples of case C subcontracting.
The same economic factors are also at work in case B subcontracting.
In cases where the motivation for the subcontracting did not involve labor
costs, the decision to subcontract is a permissive topic. In Oklahoma
Fixture Co., the employer's decision to exit from the wiring work was
driven by its inability to manage that line of business and its fear that43
accidents would cause it to lose the business of its one main customer.
Although the record is vague on the topic, it appears that the subcontractor
would hire union labor and pay approximately the same wage rates as did
Oklahoma Fixture. Consequently, the employer was not decreasing its
labor costs by subcontracting. In this situation, the employer was not
acting opportunistically. By abandoning the match-assets, it would suffer
a loss on that investment, as would the employees who would be laid off.
Effectively, the match-assets were no longer profitable when judged
against a market test.
Requiring bargaining in such circumstances, however, would allow
the union to act opportunistically. Since the decision was motivated by
factors outside of the union's control, it is unlikely that bargaining would
change the outcome. Since mandatory bargaining introduces the potential
for costly delay, the union could threaten to impose that delay in order to
extract some payment for allowing the firm to move forward with an
inevitable decision.44
The key factor for distinguishing between opportunistic and efficient
43. See Oklahoma Fixture Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 958 (1994), aff'd, NLRB v. Oklahoma
Fixture Co., 79 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 1996).
44. Note that the "effects" of the decision are a mandatory bargaining topic. Hence, the
firm must bargain over any severance payments or job-transfer rights with the union.
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subcontracting is whether control over match-assets has been transferred,
and not merely whether labor cost savings are present. Subcontracting is
opportunistic if and only if the employer will retain control over the work,
that is, when the factors identified in Fibreboardare present: similar work,
similar workplace, with control under the ultimate control of the
employer.5
A failure to appreciate the importance of control has led to
inconsistency in cases in which labor costs are a factor in the decision, but
not necessarily the causally decisive factor. As testimony to the confused
state of the law, the Board has not agreed upon a method for determining
when labor costs are the motivating factor behind the decision. The D.C.
Circuit's criticism of the plurality standard in Otis II was based on the fact
that the Board had not indicated the factors it would use to determine when
a decision "turned upon" labor costs. The D.C. Circuit thus held that:
[i]f the Board desires to adhere to the "turned upon" formula as
controlling.., it must identify for us the kinds of factors it takes
into
consideration
in
determining
the
employer's
contemporaneous motive for its decision, and then apply those
factors to the record in this case in order to determine
whether... [the facts] support[] the conclusion that the
company's decision "turned upon" entrepreneurial factors, rather
than labor costs.46
When the Board abandoned Otis II and announced a new test in
Dubuque Packing, it did not provide an answer to the question. In fact, the
legal rule for subcontracting became even murkier since the Dubuque
Packing test applied only to matters of relocation.
In Rock-Tenn Co. v. NLRB, 47 the employer subcontracted the work to
a national trucking company which integrated the work with its other
business. Despite this, the Board believed, and the D.C. Circuit concurred,
that labor costs were the "primary concern" in the decision.4 But the
Board never explained how it determined that labor costs were the primary
factor and, in ruling on the case, it failed entirely to appreciate the
importance of "control" over the work. From the opinions, it appears that
Rock-Tenn entirely left the trucking business, giving complete control
over the work to the subcontractor, which is substantial evidence that
Rock-Tenn had abandoned any match-assets and thus that the
subcontracting was not opportunistic. Despite this, the issue did not even
enter into the Board's reasoning. The Board's focus on labor costs rather
45. See Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 780 F.2d
1422, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Dubuque Packing].
47. 101 F.3d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
48. See id.
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than control led it to confuse an example of Subcontracting B (efficient
liquidation) with Subcontracting A (opportunism).
C.

The ILM Analysis of SuccessorshipDoctrine

Similarly, from an ILM perspective, three situations are of interest in
determining whether successorship doctrine deters rent seeking.
Exrr A: Efficient Transfer. The ILM of the old firm creates a
surplus. The new firm recognizes that the ELM creates a surplus
and in order to preserve the efficient ILM, willingly retains the
old firm's employees and assumes both the collective bargaining
agreement and the duty to bargain.
Case A apparently
characterizes most changes of control and rarely leads to
litigation.49 When the new firm wishes to acquire the old firm as
a going business, and to continue it as such, the new firm has no
reason to disrupt established and efficient labor relations.
Consolidations are difficult enough without making them more
so by sowing discord. The easiest way to accomplish Case A
transitions is by a merger or stock sale.
Exrr B: Efficient Liquidation. The ELM of the old firm is
defective, either creating no surplus or incurring losses. If assets
are disposed of wholesale, the new firm recognizes that the old
ILM is defective. The new firm reconfigures the operations,
including personnel practices and structures, and hires few, if
any, of the old firm's workers. Case B transitions are typically
asset sales. Case B cases are largely self-enforcing: the firm
makes credible its assertion that the ILM generates no surplus by
jettisoning it. By dissolving the old ILM, the firm precludes
itself from capturing joint surplus generated by that ILM.
EXIT C: Potential Opportunism.

The ILM of the old firm is
efficient, but the new firm denies that any surplus exists. At the
same time, the new firm attempts to capture the joint surplus by
hiring most of the old firm's employees at a wage closer to the
employees' opportunity wage and by refusing to bargain
collectively. In exit case C, the new firm tries to have it both
ways. It tries to maintain an efficient ILM while reducing the
share of the joint surplus paid to the workers. Unlike case B
situations, the new firm's representation is not self-enforcing.
By (mis)representing that no joint surplus exists, perhaps by
threatening not to hire the old workers except at lower wages, the
firm creates a basis for reducing workers' wages-and thus their
49. This is an anecdotal impression. We do not know of any evidence on the relative
frequency of cases A, B, and C.
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share of the surplus-while at the same time maintaining and
benefiting from the efficient ILM. As was true in subcontracting
law, the task of labor law successorship doctrine can best be
understood as facilitating cases A and B transitions, while
preventing case C transitions.
A failure to control the
opportunistic behavior of case C will undermine the creation and
maintenance of productive ILMs.
Consider, now, the legal doctrine. Recall the fundamental legal
differences between mergers and stock sales, on the one hand, and asset
sales on the other. As discussed above, the duty to bargain continues
unchanged through a merger or stock sale. Because the merger form is the
legal form most often used to transfer productive ILMs intact, this rule
largely blocks the employer's case C attempt to maintain the ILM but
increase its share of the joint profit by, for example, misrepresenting the
condition of the product market. 0 This is precisely what happened in
Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB: the old firm was preserved entirely intact with the
same workers and the same operations. The court correctly held that the
collective bargaining agreement and the duty to bargain continued
unchanged through the sale of stock.5 Similarly, the doctrine prohibits
union attempts to use the vulnerability of the firm during such a transition
to gain a greater share of the joint surplus.
More subtly, the legal rule also blocks the attempt to transfer a
productive ELM organization but eliminate the old workers. Contrast
Esmark with Spencer Foods. In Spencer Foods, the original owners closed
the plant and laid off the workers. After an eighteen-month hiatus,
following a stock sale, the new owners reorganized operations slightly and
reopened the plant. The new Spencer Foods refused to bargain with the
old union, accepted applications from all interested persons, including
former employees, but hired only a very small proportion of former
Spencer employees. The union charged-and the administrative law
judge, the Board, and the court all agreed-that Spencer Foods relied on
hiring criteria designed to keep the former unionized Spencer employees to

50. See Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989). Esmark, a conglomerate,
owned the leading meat packer, Swift & Co. Swift's fresh meat operations had been losing
money. Esmark claimed that, although Swift's plants were efficient in that the workers
were productive and the output was of high quality, the wage rates at the two rendered them
uncompetitive. Esmark sought to reorganize operations to put the two plants outside the
master collective bargaining agreement and outside the existing duty to bargain with the
union. Five days before Esmark sold 65% of the fresh meat operations to the public, it
closed the two plants and laid off the workers. Eight days after the public offering, New
Sipco, the subsidiary that now owned the plants, informed the union that it would reopen
the plants and, as a "successor employer," would unilaterally set lower wage rates. See id.
at 742-44, 759.
51. See id. at 752.
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2
a minimum and thus keep the union out of the plant.1
The court held that, because the layoffs were not intended to be
permanent, but only part of the "'sale of an ongoing business enterprise to
L[and] O['] L[akes], i.e., a business which encompassed the resumed
operations of the Spencer plant by S[pencer] F[oods] [albeit] under new
management, ' '5 3 and because there was an expectation that the plant would
be reopened, the duty to bargain carried forward beyond the expiration of
the CBA and through the hiatus. Moreover, the court held that applying
discriminatory criteria to avoid rehiring old workers was itself an unfair
labor practice.'
From the ILM perspective, Spencer Foods is more problematic than
Esmark. At first blush, it seems to involve a classic case B situation: the
new Spencer Foods, by not rehiring the old employees, made clear that it
did not value the old ILM. The old Spencer Food's history of poor labor
relations is consistent with this hypothesis. While in Esmark the firm
attempted to have it both ways-to retain the ILM intact (including
employees) but avoid bargaining with the union-the new Spencer Foods
put its money on the line. How, then, could Spencer Foods have been
behaving opportunistically?
Doctrinally, the answer is straightforward: antiunion animus is always
an unfair labor practice.55 Moreover, the economic rationale for this
general rule is similarly straightforward. Without such a bar, workers
would be unable to escape from their free-rider problems and bargain
collectively. Hence, for unions to facilitate efficient contracting in ILMs, a
rule prohibiting antiunion animus is necessary.
The successorship context itself also provides two additional answers.
First, to the extent that employees are asked to make ongoing investments
in the organization of work-investments that may be sunk-they will not
make optimal investments unless they are protected from ex post attempts
to grab an additional share of the joint surplus from those investments.
That is precisely what the firm may be doing when it seeks to retain the
organization of work, but to staff it with new, cheaper employees. In this
regard, the situation is nearly identical to the Fibreboard situation,
discussed above.
There is a second explanation as well. Consider a broader time frame.
Suppose that in the first period the firm refuses to rehire former employees

52. See Spencer Foods, 768 F.2d at 1467-68, 1475.
53. Id. at 1472 (quoting Spencer Foods, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1509).
54. See id. at 1475-76.
55. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
§ 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994));
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 265 (1965). See generally
1 Tim DEVELOPING LABoR LAW, supra note 5, at 185-249, 275-84.
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in order to keep out the union, but during the second period it rehires the
skilled former employees as it terminates the unskilled and inexperienced
new hires. Under such circumstances, in the second period the workers
would bear the cost and delay of reorganizing and renegotiating, having
just suffered an extended layoff due to their union membership. By
delaying the re-establishment of the efficient ILM in order to eliminate the
union, the firm might secure a greater share of the joint surplus. Indeed,
more generally, given that the division of the joint surplus-as in other
bilateral monopolies-depends on the bargaining abilities of the
participants, investing in a reputation for toughness may be worthwhile.
Consider, now, the alternative transactional form, the sale of the
assets themselves. Recall, from above, that absent tax and strategic
considerations, firms will sell assets when the ILM is unproductive and
when they wish to liquidate it. In the paradigmatic sale of assets, the asset
purchaser wishes only to acquire pieces of the asset seller, not to acquire
the asset seller as a going concern. The normal asset sale is thus a case B
situation: the asset purchaser does not value the old ILM and, by
jettisoning it, precludes itself from capturing any of the old ILM's joint
surplus. Normally, as described above, an asset purchaser only takes on
those obligations that it assumes.
Importantly, case B situations are largely self-enforcing. In these
cases, the firm's representation that the old ILM is inefficient, combined
with the firm's actions in reconfiguring the assets and not hiring the old
workers, makes the assertion inherently credible. By dissolving the old
LM, the firm puts its money where its mouth is. While the firm may be
wrong-it may be that the old ILM creates joint surplus-it cannot be
acting opportunistically.
Thus, in the case B situation, in which the asset purchaser does not
continue the old operation or hire the old workers, there is no continuing
ELM that requires protection; hence, the law treats the former workers
exactly the same as any other creditor of the firm. When the ILM is
discontinued, the corporate law's protection of creditors of the asset seller
protects former employees' contractual claims. Workers may only collect
from the asset seller anything to which they are contractually entitled
under the collective bargaining agreement, such as unpaid wages, accrued
vacation pay, and accrued pension contributions. The asset purchaser has
no special obligations to the seller's employees.
Moreover, such a rule helps to discourage both the destruction of
productive ILMs and the preservation of unproductive ILMs. An ELM
may be inefficient because the workers have used their right to strike to
extract a contract that transfers the firm's share of the surplus to the
workers. Similarly, workers may want to retain an ELM which is
inefficient for other reasons in order to maintain contract provisions that
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return a surplus to them, even when the firnm is generating losses. In both
cases, a predecessor firm stuck with such an inefficient ILM can jettison it
through an asset sale. Faced with the potential exit of the firm through an
asset sale, workers will be less likely to use their bargaining power to
extract a surplus that leaves the firm with losses.
That the prototypical asset sale involves an inefficient ILM also
explains why asset sales are governed by different rules than mergers. The
corporate law goal of encouraging efficient restructuring of those assets
that do not generate a surplus, while retaining those that do, requires
standard form mechanisms that can be applied to the two situations at low
cost. This explains why the merger cases do not apply to asset sale cases,
contrary to the expectations of traditional labor law scholars.
Of course, as in the corporate context, a background rule that asset
purchasers do not take on the seller's obligations creates the potential for
The background rule offers asset
case C strategic manipulation.
purchasers an opportunity to retain the productive old ILM, but to secure a
larger share of the joint surplus by using an asset sale rather than a merger
in order to escape from the duty to bargain. Consequently, asset buyers
and sellers will have an incentive to share in the additional portion of the
joint surplus that the sale captures from the employees.
The challenge for the legal rule is to preserve the necessary option of
dissolving an inefficient ILM and disposing of assets while blocking the
opportunistic use of that transactional form. The legal rule described
above represents an attempt to do this.
Recall the rule: when there is no substantial continuity, there is no
duty to bargain collectively until the union establishes majority support;
when there is substantial continuity, majority support is presumed, and the
firm must bargain collectively until it establishes lack of majority support.
As discussed above, when the asset purchaser jettisons the old ILM, as
demonstrated by lack of substantial continuity, no danger exists of
opportunistic behavior on the part of the firm. But when the asset
purchaser retains the old ELM, a potential for opportunistic behavior arises
that courts must constrain in order to facilitate optimal investments in
ILMs.
The necessity of controlling this sort of opportunistic behavior
provides an explanation for why labor law successorship doctrine grants
greater protection to employees than corporate law successorship doctrine
grants to creditors generally. In the general corporate case, courts protect
creditors either by requiring that the asset seller make provision for longtail claimants before dissolution or by using asset purchasers as a conduit
to impose these costs on asset sellers. But the ILM differs significantly:
labor law successorship doctrine must protect the forward-looking, matchspecific investments in the continuing ELM.
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The duty to bargain is critical to labor law's attempt to constrain
opportunistic behavior while facilitating nonopportunistic reconfigurations
of assets. As discussed earlier, the duty to bargain is an obligation to meet
and confer "in good faith" over mandatory topics, without any obligation
to reach an agreement. 6 Such a duty to bargain will facilitate the
renegotiation of terms and conditions equivalent to those in the prior LM.
But this duty only protects workers in whom the firm has made productive
investments. It does nothing to protect employees who are easily replaced.
In particular, the duty to bargain will not allow such employees to protect
any union wage premiums that they previously secured in the old
collective bargaining agreement.
The duty to bargain constrains opportunistic behavior in this context
in two ways. First, by relieving the union from the burden of showing
majority support, with the attendant costs of organizing and costs of delay,
imposing a duty to bargain lowers the employees' costs of protecting or
reestablishing the bargain over the division of the joint surplus that they
had previously struck with the asset seller. Second, by forcing the asset
buyer to corroborate claims regarding the condition of the product
markets, this duty makes it more difficult for the new employer to secure a
greater share of the joint surplus by misrepresentation.
Consider, for example, Fall River, 7 in which a majority of the asset
purchaser's work force had worked for the asset seller, doing essentially
the same work. In such circumstances, employees face a continuing
danger that the purchaser will act opportunistically, claiming that the ILM
is inefficient in order to appropriate a portion of the joint surplus while at
the same time taking full benefit of its value. Imposing a duty to bargain
helps to maintain the presumptively efficient ILM while preventing the
asset purchaser from using the uncertainty of the changeover to secure a
greater share of the joint surplus.
Moreover, such a rule imposes a minimal burden on the asset
purchaser. If the purchaser values the ILM, as demonstrated by its decision
to continue operations and to hire the old employees, then it must continue
the practice of bargaining collectively. If, on the other hand, the purchaser
does not value the ILM, it will not hire the old employees and will have no
obligation to bargain collectively. Indeed, in FallRiver the Supreme Court
seemed largely to have made a version of this argument:
Thus, to a substantial extent the applicability of [the duty to
bargain] rests in the hands of the successor. If the new employer
makes a conscious decision to maintain generally the same
business and to hire a majority of its employees from the

56. See generallyid. ch. 13.
57. See FallRiver, 482 U.S. at 27.
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predecessor, then the bargaining obligation of § 8(a)(5) is
activated. This makes sense when one considers that the
employer intends to take advantage of the trained work force of
its predecessor.58
The rule prohibiting discrimination against employees of the asset
seller on the basis of their union membership reenters at this point. As
with the merger context, if the asset purchaser could maintain operations
unchanged but escape from the duty to bargain by refusing to hire former
union members or by refusing to recognize the union, then an opportunity
would exist for unproductive strategic behavior. The rule against
antiunion animus blocks this prospect. If an asset purchaser leaves
operations unchanged but employs practices that effectively exclude
former union employees, such action constitutes evidence of antiunion
animus. After all, so long as operations are unchanged, one would expect
that the old employees in whom the firm has made match-specific
investments would be the most attractive candidates.
If a firm
disproportionally excludes the most attractive applicants, one can infer that
it excluded them in order to keep out the union. By contrast, when no
substantial continuity in operations exists, no such inference arises. To the
extent that the operations are changed, the match-specific investments in
and by the old employees have little value-indeed, they may even impose
a cost-and criteria of selection that have the effect of hiring new workers
do not suggest animus. In this way, the law governing successorship, like
the law governing subcontracting, discourages opportunistic behavior by
both employers and employees.
IV. CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have described when a duty to bargain about
subcontracting and successorship arises under the National Labor
Relations Act, and have explained many (but not all) features of the
current law as at least a roughly effective mechanism for encouraging
efficient restructuring while discouraging opportunistic behavior by the
contracting parties. The incentive-compatible contracting analysis that we
use here reveals the economic logic that underlies the legal doctrine,
thereby providing what both the cases and the more traditional analyses
fail to provide: a positive theory that provides a guide for analyzing new
cases. But, as we show in other work, the applicability and importance of
this analysis is not limited to the collective bargaining context, a relatively
marginal sector of the economy. Rather, because the NLRA system
provides our clearest window into the informal and implicit contracting
58. Id. at 40-41.

1998]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING/ASSET RESTRUCTURING

227

between firms and employees, our analysis provides the basis for a general
analysis of bargaining over asset restructuring.

